Judicial Influence on the Duty to Consult and Accommodate by Green, Andrew
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
Volume 56 Issue 3 Article 2 
12-16-2020 
Judicial Influence on the Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
Andrew Green 
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Article 
Citation Information 
Green, Andrew. "Judicial Influence on the Duty to Consult and Accommodate." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
56.3 (2019) : 529-563. 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol56/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. 
Judicial Influence on the Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
Abstract 
The duty to consult and accommodate has increasingly become front and centre in a wide range of 
resource and development projects and the related litigation. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated 
that it seeks to foster negotiation and limit litigation through its approach to the duty. This article 
examines, from a theoretical perspective, whether the Court is furthering this objective. It builds on a 
simple model of How the legislature and courts interact in the administrative law context and discusses 
how the relationship changes with the addition of Indigenous peoples seeking enforcing the government’s 
constitutional duty to consult and accommodate. It examines both decisions made by Cabinet and by an 
“independent” body such as the Canada Energy Regulator (CER). The model points to the importance of 
both the approach taken by the reviewing court and the relative political positions of relevant actors. The 
interpretation of the standard of review by different types of judges will impact the incentives to litigate 
and the probability of success from litigation. In addition, the incentive to litigate shifts as policy positions 
shift for Cabinet, for boards or for judges, but not in a straightforward fashion. The model informs not only 
the duty to consult, but judicial review in the standard administrative law context and involving other 
constitutional issues. 
Cover Page Footnote 
I’d like to thank Ben Alarie, David Green, Veronica Guido, Declan Walker, and Albert Yoon for their helpful 
comments on the article. 
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol56/iss3/2 
529
Judicial Influence on the Duty to Consult 
and Accommodate
ANDREW GREEN*
The duty to consult and accommodate has increasingly become front and centre in a 
wide range of resource and development projects and the related litigation. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has stated that it seeks to foster negotiation and limit litigation through 
its approach to the duty. This article examines, from a theoretical perspective, whether the 
Court is furthering this objective. It builds on a simple model of How the legislature and 
courts interact in the administrative law context and discusses how the relationship changes 
with the addition of Indigenous peoples seeking enforcing the government’s constitutional 
duty to consult and accommodate.  It examines both decisions made by Cabinet and by 
an “independent” body such as the Canada Energy Regulator (CER). The model points to 
the importance of both the approach taken by the reviewing court and the relative political 
positions of relevant actors. The interpretation of the standard of review by different types 
of judges will impact the incentives to litigate and the probability of success from litigation. 
In addition, the incentive to litigate shifts as policy positions shift for Cabinet, for boards 
or for judges, but not in a straightforward fashion. The model informs not only the duty to 
consult, but judicial review in the standard administrative law context and involving other 
constitutional issues.
* Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. I’d like to thank Ben Alarie, David Green, 
Veronica Guido, Declan Walker, and Albert Yoon for their helpful comments on the article.
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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS HAVE INCREASINGLY become front and centre in Canada. 
Proposed resource-related projects, for example, from mines to pipelines to 
exploration activity, have the potential to impinge on claimed or accepted 
Indigenous rights. A central feature of Aboriginal law’s attempts to deal with 
disputes about such projects is the constitutional duty on the Crown to consult 
and accommodate Indigenous peoples prior to undertaking conduct that may 
adversely affect a potential Aboriginal claim or Aboriginal or treaty right.1 The 
duty to consult and accommodate has led not only to considerable negotiation 
and discussions around proposed projects but also to a large amount of litigation.
The courts in Canada have struggled to find the right balance in their role 
in overseeing the duty to consult and accommodate. A key barrier is the need to 
recognize the constitutional nature of the duty (and hence a strong role for the 
courts) while at the same time fostering negotiations, as opposed to litigation, 
between the Crown and Indigenous groups. As the Supreme Court of Canada 
has stated, “No one benefits—not project proponents, not Indigenous peoples, 
and not non-Indigenous members of affected communities—when projects are 
prematurely approved only to be subjected to litigation.”2 The Court attempts 
to provide a backstop to consultations over resource development, encouraging 
the Crown and Indigenous peoples to negotiate through both its vision of the 
content of the duty and its stance on judicial review of the resulting decisions.
In this, is the Court doing what it thinks it is doing? As Janna Promislow and 
Naiomi Metallic note, “The perennial question surrounding the duty to consult is 
1. See Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law” in 
Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 3rd ed (Emond, 2018) 
87 at 89 [Promislow & Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law”]. Promislow and 
Metallic state that: “‘Indigenous law’ is increasingly used as an umbrella term encompassing 
the specific legal orders of Indigenous nations,” while “‘Aboriginal’ [law] signifies that the law 
of the Canadian state is the subject at hand,” such as the Constitution (ibid).
2. Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 at para 24 [Clyde River].
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whether the court prescribed enough content to tilt the risk management equation 
in favour of the protection of Aboriginal rights, and cast a long enough shadow 
to improve the political climate for negotiations.”3 Does the Court’s stance on 
the duty to consult and accommodate actually tend to foster negotiations? Even 
if so, does it advantage one side or the other in those negotiations? In one sense, 
the answer to the second question is clearly “yes,” as the Court has consistently 
stated that the duty does not provide Indigenous peoples with a veto over the 
proposed government action. Instead, the Court has stated that accommodation 
“stress[es] the need to balance competing societal interests with Aboriginal and 
treaty rights.”4 However, can we say more about the impact of the Court’s choices 
on the relative power and decisions made by the various parties involved?
Central to answering this question is the stance the Court takes to reviewing 
decisions relating to consultation and accommodation. As we will see, the Court 
takes a hybrid approach: For some questions, it tells judges to adopt their own 
view of the “correct” answer, while on others, it says the judges are to defer to 
executive decision makers, such as Cabinet. This issue of the appropriate “standard 
of review” to be adopted by courts is heavily contested, generally, and similarly 
controversial in the context of the duty to consult. A number of scholars, such as 
Promislow, for example, point to the need to reconsider the Court’s deferential 
approach to reviewing duty to consult cases.5 Further, Metallic notes that 
“administrative law rules that have developed around deference tend to place 
Indigenous peoples at a disadvantage in judicial review proceedings,” as they 
3. “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law,” supra note 1 at 119.
4. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 50 [Haida]. See 
also Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41 at para 
59 [Chippewas].
5. See Janna Promislow, “Delegation, Deference and Difference: In Search of a Principled 
Approach to Implementing and Administering Aboriginal Rights” (2019) 88 SCLR (2d) 
139 at 150-1. See also Kate Glover Berger, “Diagnosing Administrative Law: A Comment 
on Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames First Nation” (2019) 88 SCLR (2d)107; David 
Mullan, “The Supreme Court and the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples: A Lifting of 
the Fog?” (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 233 (discussing the nature of the standard of 
review in duty to consult cases); Audrey Macklin, “Standard of Review: Back to the Future?” 
in Flood & Sossin, supra note 1, 381 (discussing the inconsistencies in the approach to the 
standard of review between administrative law, generally, and the duty to consult context).
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involve deference to regulatory regimes that are skewed towards settler interests.6 
This article aims to provide some insight into the basic pressures and incentives 
the Court has created in this area.
Part I provides a brief summary of the law concerning the duty to consult 
and accommodate. It does not explore all the nuances but attempts to lay out 
the broader pattern of the role taken on by the courts. Part II then sets out 
a basic model of how the Crown, Indigenous peoples, the legislature, and the 
courts interact when Cabinet makes a decision. Prior political science literature 
has created models of such decision making in the US administrative law context. 
This article builds on these simple models to examine the Canadian administrative 
law context and extends the analysis to discuss constitutionalizing the decision 
through the duty to consult. Part III then takes that model to the situation 
where the Crown relies on an “independent” body, such as a board, to fulfill 
the duty to consult. Part IV discusses the implication of this model for how we 
think about the role of the courts, given that negotiations and reconciliation 
occur in the shadow of judicial review. The model also has implications for both 
administrative law more generally, as well as for other constitutional litigation, 
such as challenges to administrative decisions that involve the Charter.7
6. “Deference and Legal Frameworks Not Designed By, For or With Us” (2018) 31 Can 
J Admin L & Prac: Special Issue 159 [Metallic, “Legal Frameworks”] (stating that this 
argument does not preclude deference but just blanket deference to expertise to all decision 
makers). See also Matthew J Hodgson, “Pursuing a Reconciliatory Administrative Law: 
Aboriginal Consultation and the National Energy Board” (2016) 54 Osgoode Hall LJ 
125 (“[t]he extent to which the NEB’s process and reasons provide a sufficient basis for 
curial deference in these cases is, therefore, critically important to ensure just outcomes for 
Aboriginal claimants” (at 152)). Hodgson argues that if there is deference, the discretion 
exercised must take into account the constitutional nature of the duty.
7. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND 
ACCOMMODATE
For the Supreme Court, the duty to consult originates in section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and is founded on the honour of the Crown.8 The goal 
is to promote reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and the Crown as well 
as to “identify, minimize and address adverse impacts where possible.”9 The duty 
requires good faith on all sides to ensure that the consultation and, if possible, 
accommodation is meaningful.10
In Haida, the Court set out what has become a three-part test for when the 
duty is triggered.11 First, the Crown must have actual or constructive knowledge 
of a potential Aboriginal claim or Aboriginal or treaty rights. Second, there 
must be Crown conduct that has the potential to impact this claim or right. 
Crown conduct includes not only decisions of Cabinet or line departments 
but also decisions of executive decision makers, such as the National Energy 
Board (NEB)—now called the Canada Energy Regulator (CER), that are given 
power under statutes, whether or not they are the final decision makers.12 The 
Court looks beyond the claims of “independence” of these executive bodies for 
the purposes of this trigger for the duty (stating, for example, that “as the NEB 
operates independently of the Crown’s ministers—no relationship of control 
exists between them”), focusing on their purpose of implementing government 
policy.13 However, as we will see, the Court brings back in an assumption of 
independence in its view of the court’s role in the process. Finally, the Crown 
conduct must have a potential adverse effect on the claim or right. Actual, 
current effects are covered, but historic impacts are not (although the cumulative 
8. Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11; Haida, supra note 4 at para 16. 
See generally Promislow & Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law,” supra note 1; 
David V Wright, “Federal Linear Energy Infrastructure Projects and the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Current Legal Landscape and Emerging Developments” (2018) 23 Rev Const Stud 
175; Glover Berger, supra note 5; Hodgson, supra note 6.
9. Clyde River, supra note 2 at paras 19, 25.
10. Haida, supra note 4 at para 42.
11. Ibid at para 35.
12. Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 29. See also Chippewas, supra note 4 at paras 29-31 (the 
Court found that it does not matter whether the “Crown” as such is a party before the 
particular decision maker, as the NEB was a statutory body and the final decision maker).
13. Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 29. See also Sari Graben & Abbey Sinclair, “Tribunal 
Administration and the Duty to Consult: A Study of the National Energy Board” (2015) 65 
UTLJ 382 (discussing expertise and independence in this context).
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effects of a project as well as the historic context may affect the analysis of the 
scope of the duty).14
The duty itself is flexible and context dependent. It lies on a spectrum from 
limited to deep consultation, depending on the strength of the claim and the 
seriousness of the potential adverse effect.15 The placement on the spectrum helps 
identify what actual processes are required. At the limited end may be notice of 
potential decisions and the opportunity to provide comments. At the deep end 
of the spectrum, the courts have found that meaningful consultation may require 
more in the way of disclosure, oral hearings, funding for groups to participate, 
and even the provision of reasons.16 The Court recently found that the NEB had 
fulfilled its duty to consult in one case but not in another, both of which the 
Court had seen as requiring deep consultation. The Chippewas of the Thames 
were adequately consulted given the disclosure and participation involved, NEB’s 
oral hearings, and funding of the Indigenous groups involved.17 For the Inuit of 
Clyde River, on the other hand, the consultation was inadequate where the Court 
found none of these procedural elements were present.18 Further, the Court has 
stated that reasons will generally be required in the context of deep consultation.19 
Courts seem to base their decision on whether the duty has been met, at least at 
the “deep” consultation end of the spectrum, on whether there was “meaningful” 
dialogue or whether there were conditions for such dialogue to occur.20 In some 
cases, such dialogue may require that “someone” be present on the Crown side 
with some authority to speak for the Crown.21
The duty, however, is more than just procedural, at least in theory, as it is 
a duty to consult and accommodate—that is, there is a potential need for the 
14. Chippewas, supra note 4 at paras 41-42.
15. See Haida, supra note 4 at paras 39-44. The Court has stated that, in determining what the 
duty actually entails in a particular context, “regard may be had to the procedural safeguards 
of natural justice mandated by administrative law” (ibid at para 41). See also Beckman v Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 [Little Salmon] (“[a]dministrative law is flexible 
enough to give full weight to the constitutional interests of the First Nation” at para 47); 
Mullan, supra note 5 (pointing out that the structure of the duty to consult and of procedural 
fairness for other decisions is very similar).
16. Haida, supra note 4 at para 44.
17. See Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 52.
18. See Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 47.
19. Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 62.
20. See e.g. Clyde River, supra note 2 (“[n]o mutual understanding on the core issues … could 
possibly have emerged from what occurred here” at para 49). See also Gitxaala Nation v 
Canada, 2016 FCA 187 at paras 325-27 [Gitxaala]; Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (AG), 
2018 FCA 153 at paras 754-63 [Tsleil-Waututh].
21. Tsleil-Waututh, supra note 20 at para 759.
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decision maker to change its decisions in some contexts. The Court has stated 
on a number of occasions that accommodation does not amount to a veto for 
Indigenous groups.22 The aim in accommodation is to attempt to undertake “a 
process of balancing interests, of give and take.”23 In addressing concerns that 
this balancing may disadvantage Indigenous groups, particularly in decisions that 
require the decision maker to focus on the public interest, the Court has stated 
that the duty to consult implicates a “[‘]special public interest’ which surpasses 
economic concerns,” but that a balance still needs to be struck with societal 
interests.24 In the context of the NEB, for example, the Court has stated, “We 
do not, however, see the public interest and the duty to consult as operating in 
conflict. … A project authorization that breaches the constitutionally protected 
rights of Indigenous peoples cannot serve the public interest.”25 Depending 
on the context, the Crown may need to act so as to avoid irreparable harm or 
minimize adverse impacts.26 However, the Court recently noted that “[w]hile the 
goal of the process is reconciliation of the Aboriginal and state interest, in some 
cases this may not be possible. The process is one of ‘give and take’, and outcomes 
are not guaranteed.”27
Recently, the Court has attempted to clarify who is responsible for fulfilling 
the duty to consult. It has clearly stated that the Crown has this responsibility. 
The Crown may rely on administrative process or executive decision makers, 
including tribunals, to undertake all or part of the duty, provided the Crown 
gives notice it is going to rely on that process.28 It may even rely on project 
22. See Haida, supra note 4 at para 48; Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 59.
23. Haida, supra note 4 at para 48.
24. Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 59.
25. Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 40.
26. Haida, supra note 4 at para 47.
27. Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 
SCC 54 at para 114 [Ktunaxa]. The Court found that the consultation process by the 
minister was not unreasonable and that changes had been made to the proposal, but that 
process came to an end because the Ktunaxa “adopted a new, absolute position that no 
accommodation was possible … and that only total rejection of the project would satisfy 
them” (ibid at para 87).
28. See Clyde River, supra note 2 at paras 22-23. See also Chippewas, supra note 4; Graben & 
Sinclair, supra note 13 (discussing the issue of the duty to consult and administrative decision 
makers). In Chippewas, the Court found that while notice was not explicitly given that 
the Crown would rely on the NEB process, the Chippewa of the Thames were given the 
opportunity to participate and did so, knew the NEB was the final decision maker, and were 
aware that there was no other Crown actor involved, and so “the circumstances of this case 
made it sufficiently clear to the Chippewas of the Thames that the NEB process was intended 
to constitute Crown consultation and accommodation” (ibid at para 46).
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proponents for certain procedural elements. However, the responsibility remains 
with the Crown.29 The decision maker must not take an action (such as issuing 
an approval) if the duty is not met. If the decision maker does not satisfy the duty 
to consult, the Crown must take actions to ensure that it is fulfilled prior to any 
decision. These actions may include additional consultation, legislative changes, 
or making submissions before the regulatory decision maker.30
Whether a particular administrative decision maker has been granted the 
power to undertake the duty to consult or to assess whether the duty has been 
fulfilled (or both) depends on the powers granted to the decision maker by 
statute, including whether the decision maker can decide questions of law and 
what remedial powers were given to the decision maker.31 For example, in Clyde 
River, the Court found that, while the NEB was created prior to the origins of the 
duty to consult, it has a sufficient set of powers to undertake consultation (such 
as conducting hearings and granting funding), powers (in this case under another 
statute) to accommodate Indigenous concerns through terms and conditions on 
or denial of approval, and “developed considerable institutional expertise, both in 
conducting consultations and in assessing the environmental impacts of proposed 
projects.”32 The Crown could therefore rely on the NEB’s processes to completely 
or partially fulfill the duty to consult in that case. Statutory bodies like the NEB 
may take on these roles as they are capable of acting as “neutral arbitrator[s]” 
according to the Court (a point to which we will return when we discuss the 
incentives facing such bodies).33
What is the role of the courts in this process? The Court has stated that 
“the question is not whether the [Indigenous groups] obtained the outcome they 
sought, but whether the process is consistent with the honour of the Crown.”34 
However, in challenges to decisions concerning the duty to consult, while the 
Court has seen parallels between consultation and the demands of procedural 
fairness,35 it has tended to deal with duty to consult cases within its substantive 
review framework—that is, its approach to review of the substance of particular 
decisions. Following the Court’s decision in Haida, on the questions of whether 
29. See Haida, supra note 4 at para 53; Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 22.
30. See Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 32; Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 22.
31. See Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at paras 55-65.
32. Clyde River, supra note 2 at paras 31-33. See also Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 48 (the 
Court found that the NEB’s statutory powers and expertise were sufficient to allow the 
Crown to rely in whole or in part on its processes).
33. Chippewas, supra note 4 at para 34.
34. Ktunaxa, supra note 27 at para 83.
35. See Haida, supra note 4 at para 41.
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the duty to consult is triggered and, if so, what is the depth of consultation 
required, the Court has tended to use a correctness standard, ostensibly on the 
basis that there is a significant legal component to these questions.36 This standard 
permits a judge to decide for themselves the correct answer to these questions 
with no deference to the initial decision maker, such as Cabinet or the NEB.
However, on the question of whether the appropriate level of consultation 
has been achieved with the particular process used (including whether the 
accommodation was appropriate), the Court has stated that judges are only to 
examine whether the process was reasonable. In Haida, the Court stated that “the 
process itself would likely fall to be examined on a standard of reasonableness. 
Perfect satisfaction is not required; the question is whether the regulatory scheme 
or government action ‘viewed as a whole, accommodates the collective aboriginal 
right in question’ … . What is required is not perfection, but reasonableness.”37 
In the context of a ministerial decision, the Court more recently reiterated this 
standard, stating:38
The Minister’s decision that an adequate consultation and accommodation 
process occurred is entitled to deference … . The chambers judge was required to 
determine whether the Minister reasonably concluded that the Crown’s obligation 
to consult and accommodate had been met. A reviewing judge does not decide the 
constitutional issues raised in isolation on a standard of correctness, but asks rather 
whether the decision of the Minister, on the whole, was reasonable.
Part of the rationale given for such deference is the nature of the decision and 
capability of the Court. The Federal Court of Appeal thus noted in the context of 
Cabinet approval of the Northern Gateway Pipeline: 39
In this case, the subjects on which consultation was required were numerous, 
complex and dynamic, involving many parties. Sometimes in attempting to fulfil 
the duty there can be omissions, misunderstandings, accidents and mistakes. 
In attempting to fulfil the duty, there will be difficult judgment calls on which 
reasonable minds will differ.
The result therefore is a mixed standard, with correctness used for the decision 
as to whether the duty is triggered and the depth of consultation required, and 
reasonableness for the content of the process and accommodation.40 Kate Glover 
36. See Little Salmon, supra note 15 at para 48; Haida, supra note 4 at paras 61-63.
37. Ibid at para 62.
38. Ktunaxa, supra note 27 at para 77.
39. Gitxaala, supra note 20 at para 182.
40. See Glover Berger, supra note 5 (arguing that the standard of review is uncertain in the 
context of the duty to consult, with a greater emphasis on correctness).
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Berger argues that this view of the Court of the duty to consult fits with a more 
general story of administrative law—that courts have moved from skepticism of 
the administrative state to a stance of trust and confidence.41 However, it is not 
clear that there was a move in the context of the duty to consult, in that the courts 
seemed to have always evinced a basic trust or confidence in the state in fulfilling 
this duty. For example, in two of its most recent duty to consult cases, the Court 
found the duty to consult was fulfilled in one but not in another, requiring little 
of the decision maker (the NEB in each case) in terms of notice and reasons 
and rejecting only a very weak attempt at consultation.42 Interestingly, the Court 
failed in both cases to discuss the standard of review.
In its discussion of the duty to consult, the Court has focused on the need 
to increase the possibility of negotiation and reconciliation and to reduce the 
involvement of the courts.43 If there is inadequate consultation, the courts are 
to quash the Crown decision, but “judicial review is no substitute for adequate 
consultation. True reconciliation is rarely, if ever, achieved in courtrooms.”44 
Expressing a similar need to foster negotiations, the Court noted in the context 
of treaty interpretation that:45
In a judicial review concerning the implementation of modern treaties, a court 
should simply assess whether the challenged decision is legal, rather than closely 
supervise the conduct of the parties at each stage of the treaty relationship. 
Reconciliation often demands judicial forbearance. Courts should generally leave 
space for the parties to govern together and work out their differences.
The Court recognized that not allowing judicial review to resolve claims will 
lead to results that Indigenous groups view as “tragic” but stated that “in the 
difficult period between claim assertion and claim resolution, consultation and 
accommodation, imperfect as they may be, are the best available legal tools in the 
reconciliation basket.”46
41. Ibid.
42. See Chippewas, supra note 4 (duty to consult met); Clyde River, supra note 2 (duty to consult 
not met). See also Ktunaxa, supra note 27 (duty to consult also met).
43. See Haida, supra note 4 at para 51.
44. Clyde River, supra note 2 at para 24.
45. First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v Yukon, 2017 SCC 58 at para 4.
46. Ktunaxa, supra note 27 at para 86.
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II. CABINET DECISION MAKING AND THE DUTY TO 
CONSULT
What can we say about how the principal actors—Indigenous peoples, the 
legislature, executive actors such as the Cabinet, and the courts—interact in 
the context of the duty to consult and accommodate? Political scientists have 
examined how judges, executive decision makers, and legislatures interact 
strategically. For example, John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan modelled how an 
administrative agency which has been delegated the power to make policy takes 
into account the possibility that a judge or Congress may overturn its decision.47 
Similarly, agencies interpret statutes in the shadow of judicial review and legislative 
override.48 Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, for example, developed a positive 
model of statutory interpretation to show how agencies, the courts, the president, 
and Congress are all involved in the process of statutory interpretation.49 The 
focus has been on administrative decisions or statutory interpretation but not in 
a constitutional context.
Building on this literature, we can construct a simple model of how Canadian 
policy decisions are made that incorporates the basic structure of administrative 
law. Different types of executive decision makers may be involved in fulfilling the 
duty to consult, including Cabinet, individual ministers, agencies and boards, 
provincial governments, and municipalities. To start with the most clearly 
“Crown” decision maker, we will first examine a decision made by Cabinet. 
To see the basic outline of the argument, we will begin by considering a decision 
that does not affect Indigenous interests. Think, for example, of a decision on 
whether to build a pipeline that may adversely affect the environment but not 
in a way that gives rise to a duty to consult. We will then use this basic model to 
see what happens when we constitutionalize aspects of the decision through the 
duty to consult.
47. “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy” (1990) 6 JL Econ & Org 1. See also Charles 
R Shipan, “The Legislative Design of Judicial Review: A Formal Analysis” (2000) 12 J 
Theoretical Pol 269 (examining how a legislature can use the existence of judicial review to 
influence policy outcomes).
48. For a foundational paper, see William N Eskridge, Jr, “Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game” (1991) 79 Cal L Rev 613.
49. “A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation” (1992) 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 263.
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A. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISIONS
We begin then with a Cabinet decision that does not involve constitutional 
issues—that is, for which the duty to consult is not triggered. Suppose the basic 
sequence of the decision-making process is as follows:
1. A company proposes the pipeline and applies to an executive 
body for approval.
2. The legislature has empowered Cabinet to approve or deny the 
application following some decision-making process. Cabinet may 
impose conditions on the project. The next step then is for Cabinet 
to approve or deny the application, subject to any conditions.
3. If Cabinet approves the pipeline (potentially with limiting 
conditions), an environmental group or the proponent has to 
decide whether to apply for judicial review of the approval.
4. If one of them applies for judicial review of the decision, a court 
then either quashes the decision or allows it to stand.
5. If the court quashes the decision, Cabinet has a choice of 
implementing a decision that the court will accept or having 
the legislature amend the legislation to allow the approval either 
directly or indirectly.50 A key factor in our analysis is that where the 
government has a majority, the Cabinet in most cases can determine 
whether legislation is proposed and which legislation will pass in 
Parliament.51 This power provides Cabinet in the administrative law 
setting with the final move.
How will Cabinet decide given the possibility of judicial review? In part, 
it will depend on how we think Cabinet and judges decide. To aid in our later 
discussion of the duty to consult, assume that Cabinet is seeking to implement 
some “national interest” or, even more narrowly, a largely majoritarian vision. 
Cabinet has to decide how to maximize its goal. If a court quashes its initial 
50. That is, Cabinet proposes legislation that either explicitly allows this project or indirectly 
does so by altering the statute to overcome whatever defect the court found in the 
decision-making process.
51. See Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 47. In their terms, the Canadian federal government 
essentially operates under a “closed rule” in most cases where the government has a 
majority—that is, given the centralization of power in the Canadian Parliamentary system, 
Cabinet can largely determine the scope of any legislative changes (ibid at 3-4). Any 
divergence because of committees or the Senate bring the analysis closer to the “open rule” 
discussed by Ferejohn and Shipan (ibid at 5, 8).
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decision, Cabinet faces a range of costs—the direct costs of drafting and 
negotiating the revised decision or legislation as well as the costs from any delay 
such as a loss of revenue or in some cases, more importantly, a reduction in the 
probability that the company will continue with the project.
How judges decide is controversial. There is a vast literature attempting to 
tease out theoretically and empirically the determinants of judicial decisions.52 
Judges may, for example, be seen to be following the “law” in some sense, naively 
deciding according to their preferred policy outcome, strategically following their 
preferences by taking into account how other actors (such as the legislature) will 
react to a decision, or acting as any other rational actor taking into account not 
only their preferred policy but also factors such as their prestige or workload.53 
Adapting Ferejohn and Weingast’s approach to statutory interpretation, we use 
three basic attitudes that judges may take to judicial review of an administrative 
decision rather than choosing a preferred model of how judges decide; namely: 
naive deference—where a judge defers to whatever the executive body says is the 
optimal policy; sophisticated deference—where a judge exercises deference “as 
respect,” such that it does not abdicate responsibility for the decision, but they 
are willing to acknowledge a space or range of decisions that may be taken to be 
“reasonable”; and, finally, unconstrained policy maximizer—where a judge decides 
52. See e.g. Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices 
Make (CQ Press, 1998); Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, 
2008); Benjamin Alarie & Andrew J Green, Commitment and Cooperation on High Courts: 
A Cross-Country Examination of Institutional Constraints on Judges (Oxford University Press, 
2017). For Canadian studies, see Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference 
Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 
1; CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of 
Canada (UBC Press, 2007); Donald R Songer et al, Law, Ideology, and Collegiality: Judicial 
Behaviour in the Supreme Court of Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).
53. See e.g. Lee Epstein, William M Landes & Richard A Posner, The Behavior of Federal 
Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (Harvard University Press, 
2013). In the constitutional context, see Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Quantitative 
Analysis of Judicial Voting” in Malcolm Langford & David S Law, eds, Research Methods in 
Constitutional Law: A Handbook (Edward Elgar) [forthcoming] (for a discussion of different 
models of decision making).
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solely in accordance with their own policy preferences taking into account 
whether there will be a political reaction to the decision.54
In order to keep the model simple and bring out the central notion, we need 
to make three more sets of assumptions.55 First, we will think of the policy 
options as lying along a line. In terms of our example of the pipeline, you could 
think of the line setting out policies from less to more development or from less 
to more risky. For want of a better short-form term and to tie into the literature 
on judicial decision making, we will call decisions more to the left on the line to 
be “liberal” decisions and to the right “conservative,” recognizing the imperfect 
mapping of this policy domain into such political terms. This reduction of the 
policy dimensions obviously abstracts from the polycentric nature of the decisions, 
but it allows us to see the strategic interactions. Second, we will initially assume 
that the parties are rational and fully informed about the choices of other parties. 
Finally, we assume that the political actors prefer that their decisions are not 
overturned and cannot commit upfront to a particular course of decisions. This 
assumption allows us to see the strategic moves more clearly.
Each decision maker has a preference over the policy positions on the 
line, with the strength of preference declining as the policy is further from 
their ideal point. In Figure 1, assume that the line arrays potential outcomes 
from less development to more development with the optimal policy for the 
pipeline company at “P,” the Cabinet at “C,” and the environmental group at 
“E.” If there was no judicial review, the proponent would propose P and Cabinet 
would respond with approval, but only at C (that is, would approve subject to 
conditions such as a reduction in the size of the pipeline or pipeline corridor).
54. Supra note 49 at 268. Ferejohn and Weingast examine three stances of judges to statutory 
interpretation: “[n]aïve textualist” (interprets legislation as close as possible to the wishes of 
the enacting legislature), “[p]olitically sophisticated honest agent” (aims for an outcome as close 
as possible to the wishes of the enacting legislature), and an “[u]nconstrained policy advocate” 
(seeks to maximize the judge’s own policy preferences, taking into account whether its 
position is politically viable) (ibid [emphasis in original]).
55. See generally Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 47.
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FIGURE 1: PREFERENCES OF CABINET, THE PROPONENT, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP
NOTES: The line provides the array of possible policy outcomes from least development on the 
left to most development on the right. The points represent the preferred outcomes for 
an environmental group (“E”), Cabinet (“C”), and the proponent (“P”). “C1” is the 
outcome preferred by Cabinet minus the cost of delay (including loss of government 
revenue and the decreased probability that the pipeline will be built) and “C2” is the 
point to the right of C where Cabinet is indifferent to C1.
 
Now consider what happens when we introduce the possibility of judicial 
review of the approval. Once Cabinet chooses its preferred policy, both the 
environmental group and the proponent have the possibility of applying to the 
court to overturn the decision. In order to understand the impact of judicial 
review, we need to think about three factors. First, what is the type of judge—are 
they naively deferential, sophisticated in their deference, or a policy maximizer? 
Second, what are the preferences or views of the judge relative to the other 
actors—and, in particular, Cabinet? You can think of the position of the judge 
on the line as indicating their policy preferences (particularly if the judge is a 
policy maximizer) or as their view of the optimal legal position. Finally, these two 
factors interact with the third—the standard of review selected by the judge.56 
We will assume, for now, that the selection of the standard of review is exogenous 
(that is, the judge does not choose the standard of review to get to a particular 
result). In Canada, there are currently two standards of review—correctness, 
where the judge specifies what they believe is the right result, and reasonableness, 
under which the judge defers to the initial decision maker either fully (the naive 
deference view) or partially (the sophisticated deference position).
Assume that if Cabinet has to react following judicial review, the costs 
(including the potential for no development) move the policy to C1. What 
happens if the judge is much more “liberal” than Cabinet—in fact, so liberal that 
their preferred point is to the left of C1? Cabinet must make its decision in the 
face of possibly being overturned by the court on judicial review. If it knows the 
judge is naively deferential and the standard of review is reasonableness, Cabinet 
can safely set its policy at its preferred point, knowing that the judge will defer 
to its (Cabinet’s) view of the right decision. Take the opposite type of judge—the 
56. See Canada (Minster of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov].
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policy maximizer. Both Cabinet and the judge know that if the judge quashes 
a Cabinet decision at C and imposes their own preferred view, Cabinet will 
respond by altering the legislation to its best alternative in the circumstances—
C1. This, in fact, is true of any Cabinet decision to the right of C1. With a weak 
preference not to be overruled and a rational expectations assumption, Cabinet 
has no incentive to choose any policy greater than C1 and the judge no incentive 
to overturn this decision. For the same reason, in all other instances where the 
judge’s preference (including their space of reasonable outcomes) lies to the left 
of C1, the outcome will be C1.
Consider next a judge who is much more “conservative” than Cabinet—
that is, their preferred policy lies relatively far to the right of Cabinet’s preferred 
policy. As before, if the judge is naively deferential and the standard of review is 
reasonableness, Cabinet can enact its preferred policy (C) as the judge will not 
overturn it. Again, take the opposite type of judge—the policy maximizer. If the 
judge chooses their preferred policy, Cabinet will react with legislation and the 
result will be C1. However, imagine a policy, C2, for which Cabinet is essentially 
indifferent between C2 and C1. At C2, for example, there is more development 
than Cabinet prefers but without the costs of new legislation or the reduction in 
the probability of the project proceeding. On review, the judge would impose C2 
as Cabinet would be indifferent between that policy and C1 and so would not 
enact legislation, and the judge would be closer to their preferred policy. Cabinet 
can only safely choose C2 if it prefers not being overturned and is indifferent 
between C2 and C1.
Finally, judges may have views only slightly more liberal or conservative than 
Cabinet, such that C1<“J”<C2. In such cases, Cabinet will still choose its preferred 
policy (C) when faced with a naively deferential judge, as the judge would not 
overturn their decision. If the judge is willing to impose their own policy (that 
is, not just quash the decision but order the particular outcome), a judge using 
a standard of review of correctness would impose their own preferred policy (J) 
knowing that Cabinet would have no incentive to overturn it (since it would 
prefer J to C1—that is, it is not willing to bear the additional cost). Cabinet 
would therefore choose J to avoid being overturned. The only exception to this 
would be where the judge engages in sophisticated deference—that is, provides 
some space (we can refer to as between the lower bound, “JL,” and the upper 
bound, “JU”) for there to be some other “reasonable” policy than the judge’s 
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preferred policy.57 Cabinet would then choose the lower bound (JL) of the more 
conservative sophisticated judge’s range and the upper bound (JU) of the more 
liberal sophisticated judge’s range. Cabinet is then able to get slightly closer to its 
preferred outcome (C).
Table 1 sets out the outcomes for the different types of judges. Cabinet faced 
with a naively deferential judge, whether liberal or conservative, will choose its 
own preferred policy. Where the judges are much more liberal or conservative 
than Cabinet, the threat of judicial review pulls the Cabinet in the direction of 
the judge, with the distance depending on the costs imposed by the delay and 
uncertainty of losing on judicial review. Where the judge is similar to the Cabinet 
in preference, Cabinet will move towards the judge’s preferred outcome (either 
fully or partially, depending on whether the standard of review is correctness or 
reasonableness) as that is preferred to the costs of delay and uncertainty.
TABLE 1: OUTCOME BY TYPE AND PREFERENCES OF JUDGE AND BY STANDARD 






Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct
J<C1 C C1 C1 C1 C1 C1
C1<J<C C J JU J J J
C<J<C2 C J JL J J J
J>C2 C C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
NOTE: The columns represent the two different standards of review (reasonableness and 
correctness) for the three different types of judges (a judge who naively defers, another 
who defers in a more sophisticated fashion, and another who maximizes their policy 
preferences). The rows indicate the ideal position for the judge (“J”) on the line in Figure 
1. “JU” refers to the upper (right-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find 
reasonable, and “JL” is the lower (left-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would 
find reasonable.
57. This notion of a policy space extracts from the nuances of the standard but serves to 
differentiate the types of judges. See also Vavilov, supra note 56. The Court states “a 
reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of 
analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision 
maker.  The reasonableness standard requires that a reviewing court defer to such a decision” 
(ibid at para 85). It requires consideration of both the outcome and the reasoning process 
(ibid at para 87).
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For administrative law decisions then, the type and ideology of the judge 
matters in this model but only in limited respects. Naive deference means no 
actual check on Cabinet decision making, regardless of the preferred policy of 
the judge. A more extreme judge in terms of policy preferences shifts Cabinet 
in their direction, regardless of the type of judge (other than naive deference), 
as both sides have the possibility of applying for judicial review. For judges closer 
to Cabinet preferences, the judges’ preferences may lead to their choices directly 
playing out. The court influences the policy chosen even if no judicial review is 
actually undertaken where Cabinet prefers not to be overturned. One implication 
of this overall dynamic may be that in Canada, where parties have held power for 
a considerable period of time in the past, if there is a change of government after 
a long stint of a different stripe of government appointing judges, the preferences 
of judges may shift to the opposite side of Cabinet or to a more extreme position.
B. CABINET, THE COURTS, AND THE DUTY TO CONSULT
Adding in the constitutional duty to consult brings a few changes. First, Cabinet 
is no longer the final decision maker—that is, given that the duty to consult is a 
constitutional issue, in theory legislative supremacy no longer holds and Cabinet’s 
ability to resort to legislation is removed. There may be ways for Cabinet to bake 
certain types of biases into legislation, thereby affecting deference.58 However, 
on an individual decision, we will assume that the legislation is fixed and Cabinet 
cannot resort to changes for that decision. Second, access to the courts is no 
longer bilateral—only Indigenous groups can seek judicial review of a decision 
on the basis that the Crown has not fulfilled its duty to consult.
Again, begin by considering a judge who is much more “liberal” than Cabinet 
(J<C1). If the standard of review is reasonableness and the judge is naively 
deferential, Cabinet can choose its preferred outcome (C), as in the standard 
administrative law case. On the other hand, if the judge is deferential in a more 
sophisticated manner, the best Cabinet can do is JU—the upper bound of the 
range of reasonableness for that judge. If the judge is a policy maximizer, or if the 
standard of review for any type of judge is correctness, the best Cabinet can do is 
the judge’s preferred point (J). As it turns out, the same is true if the judge is only 
slightly more liberal than Cabinet (C1<J<C).
At the opposite extreme, consider a judge who is much more “conservative” 
than Cabinet (J>C2). Cabinet facing a naively deferential judge and a standard 
of review of reasonableness can still choose its preferred option (C). Also similar 
58. See Promislow & Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law,” supra note 1.
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to the previous case of a liberal judge, under a standard of review of correctness 
or with a policy-maximizing judge, the best Cabinet can do is the judge’s (now 
much more conservative) preferred outcome (J). The only difference is the case 
of a standard of review of reasonableness and a sophisticatedly deferential judge. 
The best Cabinet can now do is the lower bound of the judge’s reasonableness 
space (JL). Sophisticated deference therefore narrows the range of outcomes from 
correctness review. The same results occur in the constitutional context for judges 
who are only slightly more conservative than Cabinet (C<J<C2).
TABLE 2: OUTCOME BY TYPE AND PREFERENCES OF JUDGE AND BY STANDARD 






Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct
J<C1 C J JU J J J
C1<J<C C J JU J J J
C<J<C2 C J JL J J J
J>C2 C J JL J J J
NOTE: The columns represent the two different standards of review (reasonableness and 
correctness) for the three different types of judges (a judge who naively defers, another 
who defers in a more sophisticated fashion, and another who maximizes their policy 
preferences). The rows indicate the ideal position for the judge (“J”) on the line in Figure 
1. “JU” refers to the upper (right-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find 
reasonable, and “JL” is the lower (left-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would 
find reasonable. The table assumes the judge is willing to impose their own view (not 
merely quash and return to the original decision maker).
What then is the difference if Cabinet faces a constitutional constraint? 
Table 2 sets out the outcomes in the constitutional context. When the judge’s 
preferences are similar to those of Cabinet (either slightly more liberal or slightly 
more conservative), the outcome is the same for a standard administrative law 
decision (as seen in Table 1). In addition, judges with any type of preference, 
if they are naively deferential, then Cabinet can again choose its preferred outcome 
(C) without fear of being overturned. However, when the judge’s preferences are 
more extreme, the outcomes from there being a constitutional duty become more 
extreme. The outcomes are no longer tempered by Cabinet override but shift to 
the judge’s preference.
Given these outcomes, Indigenous groups’ preference as to the role of the 
court should depend on the position of the judge relative to Cabinet. Where 
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the judge is much more conservative than Cabinet (J>C2) in the sense of 
favouring development, Indigenous groups should prefer a standard of review 
of reasonableness. The outcome is much better than correctness if the judge 
is naively deferential and at least somewhat better if the judge defers in a 
sophisticated manner (with the size of the benefit depending on the size of the 
reasonableness space). On the other hand, for a judge who is much more liberal 
than Cabinet (J<C1), Indigenous groups will be better off with a correctness 
standard. This standard would foreclose the possibility of the Cabinet getting 
its preferred outcome (C) and would limit the downside from a sophisticatedly 
deferential judge.
What does this tell us about the Court’s current approach to standard 
of review and its hope that the parties will engage in negotiation rather than 
litigation? Recall that the current standard of review approach (to the extent that 
the Court articulates one) is a limited form of correctness review for determining 
the level of consultation required but reasonableness for the content of the duty, 
including the nature of accommodation required.
To understand the impact of this standard of review, we need to at least 
in part relax the assumption of all parties being perfectly rational and having 
full information since otherwise there would be no litigation. Consider first a 
judge who is more liberal than Cabinet (either because they were appointed 
by a prior administration or the Cabinet position shifted to the right). A strict 
reasonableness standard of review would strengthen the threat point of Cabinet 
since Cabinet can credibly threaten a position that is further to the right 
(possibly even its own preferred outcome (C)). Indigenous groups in this case 
would, on the margin, rather negotiate than risk litigation. The mixed standard 
complicates the picture somewhat as correctness strengthens the threat point 
for the Indigenous group. Correctness would increase the risk of litigation by 
increasing the probability of Indigenous groups gaining from litigation. In fact, 
a judge may be able to effectively make the standard of review into correctness if 
they want to overturn a more “conservative” outcome, since they can choose their 
own level of consultation.
If the judge is more conservative than Cabinet, either because they were 
appointed by a prior administration or because the Cabinet position has shifted 
to the left (Cabinet has become more liberal), the story is even more complicated. 
The standard of review will essentially be reasonableness. A judge seems unlikely 
to use the correctness standard to find that more is owed to an Indigenous group 
where they are more conservative or, if they did use the correctness standard, 
find that that position has not been met. If the judge is willing to impose their 
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views of the proper level of consultation and accommodation, reasonableness 
somewhat weakens the threat point for Cabinet relative to correctness, as Cabinet 
cannot credibly threaten any worse an outcome from litigation than JL, and 
there is a potential for a naively deferential judge to find that the appropriate 
policy is C. This standard then increases the strength for Indigenous groups and, 
on the margins, increases the risk of litigation as opposed to negotiation (that 
is, the Indigenous groups are more likely to view the outcome of litigation as 
worth the risk).
However, there is one further wrinkle. What happens if the judge is likely 
only to quash the decision (that is, not impose its view)? This remedy seems 
more likely in the duty to consult case with relatively conservative judges. 
If an Indigenous group, for example, challenges a Cabinet decision at C, a judge 
may seem unlikely (or unable) to impose less procedure (that is, to take away 
procedure already given, unless the decision is not already made), and judges 
may be reluctant to second guess Cabinet to say that the honour of the Crown 
demands less accommodation than is already given. In this case, the result would 
then be asymmetrical. Where the judge is more liberal than Cabinet, they may be 
willing to impose their view of greater procedure or accommodation, and, in any 
event, the threat of quashing moves Cabinet towards the judge’s position. Where 
the judge is more conservative, they may be only willing to quash decisions, 
in which case the judge would uphold any decision to its left, regardless of the 
standard of review (recall that only Indigenous groups can bring duty to consult 
claims, meaning they are going to be asking for more process or accommodation). 
In that case, the best that Indigenous groups can hope for would be that they can 
threaten to impose a cost on Cabinet (both the cost of litigation itself and delay 
in the project) if Cabinet attempts to apply its optimal position (C). Its best hope 
is then to negotiate with Cabinet to move it towards C1 through the threat of 
litigation—that is, to the position Cabinet would be in following litigation. The 
threat will be credible; the Indigenous group knows it will lose but at least it may 
move the position a little to the left. Cabinet then has some incentive to attempt 
to negotiate to reduce the probability of litigation.
The result is that the Supreme Court’s current mixed strategy has two 
effects. First, the approach somewhat strengthens the position of Indigenous 
groups relative to Cabinet by weakening the threat point of Cabinet, regardless 
of whether the judge is more or less conservative than Cabinet. The exception is 
where a judge is unwilling to impose their views (i.e., will only uphold or quash a 
decision) and is more conservative than Cabinet. In that case, both reasonableness 
and correctness weaken the threat point of Indigenous groups, as there is no 
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realistic potential for the decision to be quashed. Their threat becomes dependent 
on the cost of delay in both monetary terms and risk that the project will not be 
undertaken (and contingent on Indigenous groups having resources to credibly 
make such a threat).
Second, and relatedly, the approach increases the risk of litigation rather than 
negotiation. If the judge is more conservative than Cabinet, to the extent there 
is any uncertainty about the type of judge (that is, that the judge may be naively 
deferential) and judges impose their own policy preferences, reasonableness 
means that Indigenous groups have some greater probability of gain from 
litigation than under correctness. If the judge will only quash, Indigenous groups 
facing a conservative judge may still be willing to bear the costs of litigation, 
as it moves Cabinet towards C1. If the judge is more liberal, Indigenous groups 
have greater incentive to litigate given the correctness aspect of the test, as that 
may increase their probability of moving the policy to the left. The result is then 
that the current Court model enhances the bargaining position of Indigenous 
groups generally but with a higher probability of litigation on the margin.
III. DOES ADDING AN “INDEPENDENT” AGENCY MAKE A 
DIFFERENCE?
Next, consider the case of the legislature delegating the approval decision to 
some other “independent” decision maker—that is, a public body that is not 
the Cabinet or a line ministry, such as the Ministry of Natural Resources. In the 
pipeline example, we can think of the NEB (we will use the NEB as opposed to 
the CER to tie in with the language of recent court decisions). Depending on 
the structure set in the legislation delegating the power, this body may be more 
or less independent of Cabinet. Cabinet may control the body through a range 
of means such as the granting of appointments, the threat of removal or of not 
reappointing a member, the establishment of guidelines for decision making, and 
the implementation of a budget for the decision maker .59
59. Andrew Green, “Delegation and Consultation: How the Administrative State Functions 
and the Importance of Rules” in Flood & Sossin, eds, supra note 1, 307 at 320-21 [Green, 
“Delegation and Consultation”]. See also Clyde River, supra note 2. This notion of the 
connection between the body and the Cabinet has not been fully recognized by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, which has stated that there is “no relationship of control” between the 
Crown (Cabinet, in effect) and such bodies (ibid at para 29).
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A. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISIONS
As with the case of Cabinet being the sole decision maker, first consider a purely 
administrative law decision that does not involve the duty to consult. In this case, 
the sequence of the decision-making process is as follows:
1. A company proposes the pipeline and applies to the executive body 
(the “Board”) for approval.
2. The legislature has empowered the Board to approve or deny 
the application following some decision-making process. The 
Board may impose conditions on the project. The second step is 
then for the Board to approve or deny the application, subject to 
any conditions.
3. If the Board approves the pipeline, an environmental group or the 
proponent has to decide whether to apply for judicial review of the 
(possibly conditional) approval.
4. If one of them applies for judicial review of the decision, a court 
then either quashes the decision or allows it to stand.
5. If the court quashes the decision, Cabinet then has a choice of 
implementing a decision that the court will accept or having the 
legislature amend the legislation to either directly or indirectly 
allow the approval.60 Thus, Cabinet still has the last word, but the 
Board is the first mover.61
 As seen in Figure 2, we will assume that there is some difference between 
the preferences of the decision maker (“B”) and that of Cabinet (“C”), with the 
size of the difference depending on the degree of independence of the body. 
Note that the difference may come from different preferences of the members 
of the decision maker and Cabinet or, even if Cabinet appointed individuals 
with similar preferences to their own, from some use of the body’s expertise in a 
non-political fashion. The decision maker may lie to the left of Cabinet at BL (as 
in Figure 2(a)) or the right of Cabinet at BC (as in Figure 2(b)).
60. That is, Cabinet proposes legislation that either explicitly allows this project or indirectly 
does so by altering the statute to overcome whatever defect the court found in the 
decision-making process.
61. For an administrative law problem with a similar sequence see Ferejohn & 
Weingast, supra note 49.
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FIGURE 2: PREFERENCES OF CABINET, THE BOARD, THE PROPONENT, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP
(a) Board More “Liberal” than Cabinet
(b) Board More “Conservative” than Cabinet
NOTES: The line provides the array of possible policy outcomes from least development, on the 
left, to most development, on the right. The points represent the preferred outcomes for an 
environmental group (“E”), Cabinet (“C”), an executive decision maker which is “liberal” 
(“BL”) or “conservative” (“BC”), and the proponent (“P”). C1 is the outcome preferred by 
Cabinet minus the cost of delay (including loss of government revenue and the decreased 
probability that the pipeline will be built) and C2 is the point to the right of C where 
Cabinet is indifferent to C1.
Given that the Board gets to make the first move, it may be able to forestall 
reaction by either the courts or by Cabinet, if it chooses properly. The analysis 
is similar to where Cabinet is the primary decision maker, but there are a few 
differences. First, where the judge is naively deferential and the standard of review 
is reasonableness, the judge will be deferring to the Board. The Board can forestall 
being overturned by either the Court or Cabinet if it sets its policy as closer to 
that of Cabinet but where Cabinet will not want to act. Where the Board is 
more liberal than Cabinet, it would set its policy at C1 and, if more conservative, 
at C2. Adding in the independent decision maker then moves the policy decision 
away from Cabinet’s preferred position (C)—where it was when Cabinet was 
the decision maker—towards the Board but not completely to the position of 
the Board. A second difference exists when the judge is sophisticated but has 
non-extreme preferences (C1<J<C2). In each case, a more liberal board will be 
able to set its policy at the lower end of the judge’s policy space at best (and 
conservative at the upper end). The Board can then exert at least a small pull in 
its direction using the span of reasonableness offered by the judge.
As seen in Table 3, for all other cases, the outcomes are the same where 
there is no constitutional component, regardless of whether the decision maker is 
Cabinet or a board. The more liberal judges pull the decision in a liberal direction 
and the more conservative in a more conservative direction. The result is that 
if the “independent” decision maker has preferences that align with your own 
relative to Cabinet (for example, an environmental group and a liberal board 
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or a proponent and a conservative board), you would prefer reasonableness 
regardless of the type or ideological preference of the judge, with the best being 
a naively deferential judge. If the “independent” agency’s preference is opposed 
to yours relative to Cabinet, then you would prefer correctness regardless of the 
preferences of the judge, with the worst being a naively deferential judge acting 
under a reasonableness standard.
TABLE 3: OUTCOME BY TYPE AND PREFERENCES OF JUDGE, BY POSITION OF 
BOARD, AND BY STANDARD OF REVIEW—ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISION (NO 
DUTY TO CONSULT)






Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct
J<C1 C1 C1 C1 C1 C1 C1
C1<J<C C1 J JL J J J
C<J<C2 C1 J JL J J J
J>C2 C1 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2






Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct
J<C1 C2 C1 C1 C1 C1 C1
C1<J<C C2 J JU J J J
C<J<C2 C2 J JU J J J
J>C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
NOTES: The columns represent the two different standards of review (reasonableness and 
correctness) for the three different types of judges (a judge who naively defers, who defers 
in a more sophisticated fashion, and who maximizes their policy preferences). The rows 
indicate the ideal position for the judge (“J”) on the line in Figure 1. “JU” refers to the 
upper (right-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find reasonable, and “JL” 
is the lower (left-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find reasonable.
B. “INDEPENDENT” BODIES, THE COURTS, AND THE DUTY TO CONSULT
How does this change if we now add in the duty to consult where a board is 
making the decision? Table 4 sets out the outcomes where there is a board deciding 
in the context of the duty to consult. First, consider a naively deferential judge. 
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When Cabinet was the final decision maker, it could choose its preferred policy 
(C). Adding an “independent” agency in the non-constitutional context shifted 
the policy in the direction of the Board. In the context of a constitutional duty 
to consult, a board faced with a naively deferential judge and a reasonableness 
standard can shift the policy even further, all the way to its preferred policy (either 
BL or BC, whether more or less liberal than Cabinet, respectively), as Cabinet 
cannot enact legislation to counteract the judge’s determination.
TABLE 4: OUTCOME BY TYPE AND PREFERENCES OF JUDGE, BY POSITION OF 
BOARD, AND BY STANDARD OF REVIEW—DUTY TO CONSULT






Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct
J<C1 BL J J J J J
C1<J<C BL J JL J J J
C<J<C2 BL J JL J J J
J>C2 BL J JL J J J






Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct Reasonable Correct
J <C1 BC J JU J J J
C1<J<C BC J JU J J J
C<J<C2 BC J JU J J J
J>C2 BC J J J J J
NOTES: The columns represent the two different standards of review (reasonableness and 
correctness) for the three different types of judges (a judge who naively defers, who defers 
in a more sophisticated fashion, and who maximizes their policy preferences). The rows 
indicate the ideal position for the judge (“J”) on the line in Figure 1. “JU” refers to the 
upper (right-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find reasonable and “JL” 
is the lower (left-most) extreme of the policies that the judge would find reasonable. “BL” 
refers to the optimal position for a board that is more “liberal” (to the left) of Cabinet and 
“BC” for a board that is more “conservative” (to the right) of Cabinet.
Second, for extreme judges (those much more liberal or conservative than 
Cabinet), where the judge is willing to impose their own decision (as opposed 
to quash), the outcome will be more extreme. In the non-constitutional context, 
GREEN,  JUDICIAL INFLUENCE 555
the outcome moves to C1 or C2 where the decision maker is either Cabinet or 
a board. In the constitutional context, the outcome moves out to the judge’s 
preferred outcome (J) or, depending on the relative position of the Board and the 
judge, perhaps even the extreme end of the judge’s policy range (if the standard is 
reasonableness). Finally, for judges with similar preferences to those of Cabinet, 
the outcomes are the same in the constitutional and non-constitutional cases 
(except, as noted, where the judge is naively deferential and the standard of 
review is reasonableness).
Given these outcomes, the relative ordering of reasonableness and 
correctness in general appears to remain the same in the constitutional as in 
the non-constitutional case—reasonableness if the Board is aligned with your 
preferences (regardless of the position of the judge), and correctness if the Board 
is opposed to your preferences (again, regardless of the position of the judge). 
However, remember that only Indigenous peoples can bring duty to consult 
applications. This asymmetry means Cabinet is no longer central to the analysis 
but, instead, the focus is on the location of the Board relative to the judge. 
Indigenous peoples are not likely to challenge a decision where the judge is to the 
right of the Board (as they will lose), although, again, there may be some delay 
value.62 When the judge is to the left of the Board, the Indigenous group may 
challenge its decisions, with correctness giving them a stronger position than 
reasonableness.
Does this analysis tell us anything different about the Court’s chosen 
standard of review in the context of a board as the final decision maker? Consider 
a board that is more liberal than Cabinet. Where the judge is to the left of the 
Board, Indigenous groups may be able to get the decision quashed through either 
the correctness or the reasonableness standard, with the exception of a naively 
deferential judge using a standard of reasonableness. If the judge is to the right of 
the Board, the Indigenous groups cannot credibly threaten litigation (except for 
the delay value) regardless of the standard and may then focus on negotiation. 
Similarly, when the Board is more conservative than Cabinet, a judge to the 
left of the Board increases the value and probability of litigation for Indigenous 
groups, and a judge to the right of the Board forecloses the threat of litigation.
62. Recall that we are working with an assumption of perfect information for now. However, 
the parties are not likely to know the identity of the judge (or panel of judges) until after an 
application for judicial review is launched. You could think in terms of the parties having 
knowledge of the median judge on the relevant court which would then bring in the parties’ 
expected outcomes.
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As a result, if Cabinet relies on a board to fulfill the duty to consult, the basic 
structure of the problem remains the same. The Court’s approach increases the 
threat point (and possibility of litigation) for Indigenous groups when the judge 
is to the left of the decision maker. When the judge is to the right, Indigenous 
groups have no real prospect of succeeding and there should therefore be less 
litigation, unless Indigenous groups are using the litigation for the delay value 
(that is, to extract more from negotiations or reduce the probability of the 
project due to the uncertainty). The effect of having a board rather than Cabinet 
as the decision maker, though, can be quite stark depending on the relative 
positions of the actors.
IV. NEGOTIATION AND LITIGATION
The duty to consult raises difficult questions about the scope of the duty, who 
gets to decide how and whether the duty is fulfilled, and the substantive value 
of the duty. In this article, we use a simple positive political theory model to 
try to map some of the strategic concerns underlying the relationship between 
the principal parties. The contours of the problem are smoothed out by various 
limiting assumptions, such as the rationality of the parties and knowledge about 
the relative position of each of the actors. However, the model allows us to see 
some of the basic paths that influence decisions.
The underlying layout of the choices can be seen most easily where the 
administrative law decision does not raise constitutional issues. Judicial review 
shifts decisions in the direction of the preferences of the reviewing court, except 
where the judge is willing to completely defer to the views of the executive 
decision maker. This shift occurs because challenges are two-sided, in the sense 
that parties on both sides of a particular issue can apply for judicial review. 
Where either Cabinet or an “independent” body makes the initial determination, 
Cabinet still retains the final say after judicial review. However, the sequence of 
decision making matters. If Cabinet is the initial decision maker and dislikes 
being overruled by the courts, it will not choose its preferred policy but a policy 
that will not be overturned, taking into account whether the reviewing judge is 
more liberal or more conservative than itself. If an “independent” body is the 
initial decision maker, the body can use its first-mover advantage to forestall both 
judicial review and Cabinet or legislative override. In that case, the Board does 
not choose its optimal policy but a policy more in line with that of Cabinet, 
regardless of the preferences of the reviewing court.  The exception is where the 
judge is naively deferential to the initial decision maker. In that case, Cabinet can 
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choose its preferred policy, but a board must still act in the shadow of Cabinet 
override and therefore must moderate its choice to reduce the probability of 
Cabinet override.
This simple model highlights a few features of the relationship between the 
executive, the courts, and the affected parties. First, the interaction between the 
views and the type of reviewing judge is important to the final outcome. The views 
of the judge are irrelevant where the judge is naively deferential and the standard 
of review is reasonableness. Correctness makes the type of judge irrelevant (on 
the assumption that correctness allows the judge to adopt what they feel is the 
best outcome). It is the combination of reasonableness and different views that 
plays some role in the outcome.
Second, the first-mover advantage of the “independent” agency provides it 
with a limited ability to shape decisions towards its own preferences. However, 
it is Cabinet’s last move that shapes the agency’s choices. Judicial review in this 
model of administrative decisions is then somewhat democratic if that means 
shaping decisions in the light of Cabinet’s preference over this particular decision. 
At least where there is complete information and the parties behave rationally, 
the Board’s initial decision will stand but will reflect Cabinet’s views as well.63 
The interaction of the different players provides some context for criticisms of 
the Court’s approach to administrative law over time. Support for more or less 
deference may depend on your assumptions about the positions of the different 
actors relative to each other but also relative to your own general policy preferences. 
This connection between support for deference and policy preferences has and is 
playing out in the United States. Support for and criticism of their administrative 
framework, including the Chevron doctrine, is aligned with political leanings—
with conservatives initially supporting its underlying deference when it was in 
line with a more conservative set of policies but more recently criticizing it, 
seeing it as fostering an expansive regulatory state.64 Similarly, in Canada, one 
question that arises is whether there is a connection between support for a more 
or less deferential approach and the assumptions about the nature and relative 
orientation of the judiciary relative to government.
Third, the Court has stated that, “[r]easonableness is a single standard that 
takes its colour from the context.”65 The nature of the deference analysis changes 
63. See Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 47.
64. See Cass R Sunstein, “Chevron as Law” (2019) 107 Geo LJ 1613 (discussing the different 
views of Chevron over time and its correlation with political ideology).
65. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59. See also Vavilov, 
supra note 56 at para 85.
(2020) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL558
with, for example, the nature of the decision maker and the decision. The result 
seems to be that where, for example, Cabinet is deciding a broad question (such 
as whether a pipeline is in the “national interest”), judges are likely to be very 
close to naive deference. For example, the Federal Court of Appeal in Gitxaala, 
dealing with approval of the Northern Gateway Pipeline, stated that Cabinet:66
was entitled to assess the sufficiency of the information and recommendations it 
had received, balance all the considerations—economic, cultural, environmental 
and otherwise—and come to the conclusion it did. To rule otherwise would be to 
second-guess [Cabinet’s] appreciation of the facts, its choice of policy, its access to 
scientific expertise and its evaluation and weighing of competing public interest 
considerations, matters very much outside the ken of the courts.
Boards, on the other hand, may not get such a high level of deference and 
therefore may be more likely to face a version of sophisticated deference. These 
differences will potentially impact the pull of the courts and the nature of the 
dynamic at play.
Finally, the model shows the importance of the reason for and structure of 
the “independent” agency. Cabinet may establish these agencies for a number 
of reasons. As we discussed, Cabinet may be attempting to have the decision 
taken on the basis of expertise or may wish for decisions to be made that are 
independent of political influence for other reasons (such as credibility or policy 
stability). The difference between Cabinet’s optimal policy and that of the Board 
is meant to reflect these values. The pull of the decision towards the views of 
Cabinet in the model serves, in part, to undermine these reasons. At the same 
time, the Board’s ability to pull away policy from Cabinet’s preferred outcome at 
least shows some effect of creating these bodies. We have, of course, assumed that 
there is some independence of the Board. To the extent that the Cabinet creates 
a body that mimics its own preferences, then the two cases (either Cabinet or the 
Board being the initial decision maker) collapse into one. Cabinet could create 
such a board for efficiency reasons (to allow its preferences to prevail over a wider 
range of decisions without having to be involved in the decision)67 or possibly 
to provide the illusion of independent (perhaps expert) decision making without 
the risk of unwanted policy decisions.
66. Gitxaala, supra note 20 at para 157.
67. See Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 47 at 8. In a slightly different context, Ferejohn and 
Shipan point out that the question then becomes: Why does Parliament or Cabinet delegate 
to the Board if they are not providing answers that are consistent with Cabinet’s preferences? 
Their answer is that there are likely efficiency gains and Cabinet retains the power to review 
and alter ultimate policy decisions.
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The constitutional context, particularly that of the duty to consult, 
brings greater complexity, in part because challenges are now one-sided—only 
by Indigenous groups. There are a number of departures from the straight 
administrative law case. First, naively deferential judges lead to even starker 
outcomes, if operating under a reasonableness standard. Where Cabinet is 
the initial decision maker, the decision rests at their preferred outcome (that 
is, the preferred outcome of an elected, majoritarian body), even though it is a 
constitutional issue. However, where a board is involved, the outcomes shift out 
to its preferred outcome and, depending on the makeup of the body, the swing 
could be quite significant.
Second, the one-sided nature of the challenges under this model means that 
any challenge facing a judge whose preferences lie to the right of the initial decision 
maker will fail. The result will be either fewer challenges in such cases or only 
challenges where the challenge has a delay value (such as reducing the probability 
of the development). Where the judge lies to the left of the decision maker (that 
is, substantively more aligned with the Indigenous group), the Court’s standard 
should foster litigation—the combined correctness/reasonableness standard 
providing a greater incentive for litigation relative to reasonableness alone, 
as it increases the probability of success. Part of your view of the effect of the duty 
to consult framework will depend on your view of the likely relative position of 
Cabinet as opposed to judges. If you believe judges will tend to have preferences 
very close to or to the left of Cabinet, the result would likely be greater litigation.
Third, this effect on probability of success makes the position of the initial 
decision maker important to the probability of litigation versus negotiation. 
Consider the two positions of the board relative to Cabinet. A “liberal” board 
should face less litigation than Cabinet, not only because its preferences lie to 
the left of Cabinet, but also because it is less likely that there will be judges 
whose views lie to the left of the Board than of Cabinet. The Board may not 
provide a significantly better policy than Cabinet from the perspective of the 
Indigenous group (such as where their preferred level of development is none), 
but the probability of success in litigation may be significantly reduced. For the 
same reason, a “conservative” board will face much higher levels of litigation than 
Cabinet and certainly more than a “liberal” board.
The outcome will then depend on the relationship between the parties. Again, 
it points to the need to carefully consider the structure of any decision-making 
body. Cabinet may be able to use its powers of appointment, for example, to shift 
the location of the Board to obtain particular results, which may have impacts 
even within a constitutional setting. The Court’s claim that these boards and 
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agencies are “independent of control” of Cabinet is not true in almost all cases, 
given the control Cabinet has on appointment and other aspects of these bodies’ 
existence and mandate.68 Further, its claim that these bodies can act as neutral 
arbiters of constitutional issues, such as the duty to consult (not to mention 
other constitutional questions), requires an ability and willingness to ignore the 
pull of Cabinet which is, at its core, an empirical question. This pull exists even 
without getting into the more basic levels of control by the legislature raised by 
Metallic who argues that where the substance of the enabling legislation is biased 
to begin with, deference leads to biased decisions.69 In the constitutional context, 
Cabinet may not be able to change an existing decision of the Court, but it may 
be able to shape that decision ex ante or future decisions ex post by changing the 
nature of the delegation (and perhaps, for example, the level of deference offered 
by the courts).
As Audrey Macklin notes, in the Charter context, we need judges to police 
Charter rights because they are independent from the legislature and the executive. 
She argues that in the Charter context, “decisions by elected officials (legislators) 
are distrusted precisely because they might be inclined to trade off individual 
rights in the name of political gain.”70 We worry about deferring to those who 
are close to the political branch in this context. The same holds true for the duty 
to consult. This model of constitutional decision making is applicable to many 
more general Charter challenges implicating administrative decision makers.
Further, independence has an important connection to expertise. Expertise 
may provide a measure of independence to a decision maker where the expertise 
ties the decision maker into professional or reputational norms (for example, 
doctors may have certain norms of decision making in the context of medical 
decisions).71 The fact that the individual or body is an expert may make it 
more likely that they are able, or feel obligated, to make decisions in line with 
that expertise, as opposed to submitting to political considerations. However, 
there is an equally as strong (or even stronger) tie in the other direction. Some 
measure of independence may be necessary to be sure that expertise is actually 
being exercised. If we feel that expertise allows better decisions about Indigenous 
68. For a discussion of the issue of the expertise and independence of the NEB, see Graben & 
Sinclair, supra note 13. Graben and Sinclair studied NEB decisions implicating the duty to 
consult. See generally Green, “Delegation and Consultation,” supra note 59.
69. See “Legal Frameworks,” supra note 6.
70. Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative Discretion and the 
Charter” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 561 at 574 [Macklin, “Charter Right”].
71. See Adrian Vermeule, “Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the 
Administrative State” (2017) 130 Harv L Rev 2463.
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claims, we need to be sure it is actually being exercised and decisions are not being 
altered to meet political demands. As a possible example, in their study of NEB 
decisions, Graben and Sinclair found that the NEB does not use appropriate 
legal standards to assess whether the duty to consult has been met.72 Judges 
deferring to politically accountable actors on constitutional rights on the basis 
that they have expertise raises concerns about whether that expertise is actually 
being exercised. The duty to consult context may be different than the Charter 
context in this sense. In the Charter context, Macklin notes that judges should 
decide, as they may have both expertise and independence.73 However, in the 
duty to consult context, there may be more of a trade-off between expertise and 
independence. There are considerable context-specific decisions that judges may 
not have relative expertise to make but do have the independence. We need to 
think about how the trade-off affects the final decision.74
This simple model shows some potential influences on decision making, 
particularly from the strategic interaction of different parties to decisions. It applies 
to administrative law decisions generally, as well as to constitutional questions 
beyond the duty to consult. However, like any model, it is a simplification and 
rests on some fairly strong assumptions. The assumptions about perfect rationality 
and full information are obviously false and would result in no litigation at all, 
but they provide some insight into the general pull from the context. One basic 
piece of information that is missing upfront is the identity of the judge or judges 
that will hear the application. This information is not revealed until after the 
application is launched. However, you may have some information about the 
average preferences of judges on the relevant bench relative to Cabinet or a 
board. The variance of the judges’ preferences would be much higher than that of 
Cabinet (which would depend on the median minister or perhaps just the Prime 
Minister) or a board, as judges will be appointed over time and, moreover, sit 
in panels (and, on lower courts, sit alone). The partial exception is the Supreme 
Court of Canada which has only nine members, but, even there, the Chief Justice 
72. Graben & Sinclair, supra note 13 at 415.
73. “Charter Right,” supra note 70 at 578-79.
74. See David Mullan, “Unresolved Issues on Standard of Review in Canadian Judicial Review 
of Administrative Action —The Top Fifteen!” (2013) 42 Adv Q 1. Mullan has pointed to 
this connection in the general administrative law setting. In the statutory interpretation 
context, judges may be more hesitant to defer to ministers than adjudicative tribunals out 
of fear that ministers will not base their decisions on their expertise. Mullan also notes that 
tribunals which are not actually independent should perhaps not benefit from a presumption 
of expertise. See also Hodgson, supra note 6 (for an argument in support of consideration of 
a specialized tribunal to assess the adequacy of consultation).
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has the ability to choose the size and identity of the panel hearing the appeal, 
thereby reducing the certainty in the preferences of the judges deciding the issue.75
The assumption that the problem is unidimensional and can be thought of as 
being on a simple left/right, liberal/conservative line is also very strict and stylized. 
The problems underlying the duty to consult and, in fact, other constitutional 
and many administrative law contexts, are multi-dimensional. However, the 
model is meant to illuminate the basic influences from these situations, even 
though it abstracts from a realistic portrayal of these disputes.
We have also considered a few different types of judges—those that are 
naively deferential to the executive decision maker, those that defer but in a more 
circumspect manner based on their own baseline views, and those that aim for 
their own preferred outcome. While we have said that the latter are aiming to 
maximize their preferred policy, they could also be thought of as simply working 
from their best view of the law (that is, in the terms of judicial decision making, 
working from a legal model as opposed to an attitudinal model). The story can be 
made more complex through different assumptions about these judges but these 
three help with understanding some of the core questions about the differences 
between reasonableness (and shades of reasonableness) and correctness.
Finally, we assume static preferences for the principal actors such as 
the Cabinet, the Board, and even the Indigenous groups. This assumption is 
potentially problematic in the context of the duty to consult, as one of the reasons 
for consultation is to attempt to have the parties understand and internalize the 
other parties’ views and concerns, with the possible alteration of what they see 
as the optimal policy. This connection between procedure and substance and the 
nature of these dynamics in the context of procedural questions is interesting. 
On a basic level, you can use the same basic structure to think about procedural 
choices—that is, with the line being an array of procedures from more to less, 
with Indigenous groups seeking more to hopefully alter the substance of the 
outcome and the executive seeking less to minimize cost and delay. However, 
a more fulsome model would build the connection between substance and 
process to a greater extent.
Given these assumptions, however, what can we say about the Court’s 
approach to the duty to consult? The combination of the Court’s choice of 
standard of review and the one-sided nature of the challenges means that the 
impact of its approach depends on the relative positions of the relevant actors. 
The incentive to litigate shifts as policy positions shift for Cabinet (such as 
75. Benjamin Alarie, Andrew Green & Edward M Iacobucci, “Panel Selection on High Courts” 
(2015) 65 UTLJ 335.
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following elections), for boards (again, following elections where new members 
are appointed or structures are changed), or for judges (with new appointments 
to the bench), but not in a straightforward fashion. Further, the interpretation 
of the standard of review by different types of judges will impact these incentives 
to litigate and the probability of success from litigation. The Court recognizes 
that the duty to consult is not a static, objective exercise of applying the 
constitution, but it underestimates the importance of the underlying dynamic 
relationship between the main players. A simple call for greater negotiation will 
not be effective without considering how to use these relationships to build the 
incentives for all parties to negotiate rather than become bound in seemingly 
endless cycles of litigation.
